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Abstract
We study the bargaining relationship between a firm and its in-
cumbent worker who possesses firm-specific human capital. We show
that, in the contract renewal stage, the worker’s ability to use his firm-
specific skills strategically increases his bargaining power vis-a-vis the
firm. The firm can threaten to fire the worker and hire a new inexperi-
enced worker, but this threat is not always credible. Even though the
bargaining takes place in an environment with perfect information,
the game has ineﬃcient equilibria where delays occur in real time.
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1 Introduction
Employment contracts are inherently incomplete. In a typical employment
contract the worker agrees to carry out the instructions of the employer,
within broad limits, in return of a prespecified wage. In the absence of com-
prehensive contracts, productive eﬃciency requires successive adaptations to
the changing job and market conditions. In the implementation of these
adaptations, parties may find it profitable to bargain ex-post over the terms
of the contract within the contract period as well as in the contract renewal
stage. If the labor market is competitive, the ex-post bargaining between
the firm and its employees results in an eﬃcient allocation, as the firm can
replace its employees costlessly without any disruption in production. How-
ever, most jobs involve non-trivial firm-specific skills and information which
develop during the course of the worker’s employment. Employees such as,
high level managers, sales representatives, key product engineers, and mem-
bers of the production teams possess firm-specific human capital, and the firm
cannot replace them with new inexperienced workers at the spot labor mar-
ket. Although the firm’s initial hiring decision takes place in a competitive
labor market, once the worker’s skills are developed as a result of experience,
the employment relationship resembles a bilateral monopoly. Therefore, in
the ex-post bargaining game the hold-up problem may arise. 1 This, in turn,
may create ineﬃciencies both ex-ante and ex-post.
In this paper, we study the bargaining relationship between a firm and
its incumbent worker who possesses firm-specific human capital. We show
that, in the contract renewal stage, the worker’s ability to strategically dis-
close his skills increases his bargaining power vis-à-vis the firm. The firm
can threaten to fire the worker and hire a new inexperienced worker, but this
threat is not always credible. Even though the bargaining game takes place
in an environment with perfect information, there exist ineﬃcient equilibria
in which delays occur in real time. The wage bargaining between the firm
1There is an extensive literature on the hold-up problem in bilateral relationships and
its remedies. Among these, Grossman and Hart [9] studied the incentives to invest in
relationship-specific investment when there is contractual incompleteness. Rogerson [17],
Chung [5], MacLeod and Malcomson [12] are among those who studied the contractual
solutions to ex-ante ineﬃciency that is created by ex-post hold-up problem.
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and its skilled workers results in ex-post ineﬃciency in the production. This
supports the arguments in Williamson et. al. [22] that sequential spot con-
tracting in the labor market is not eﬃcient when firm-specific human capital
is important.2
The specialized skills and information which we call firm-specific human
capital, develop either as a part of on-the-job training or accrue naturally
during the course of employment. In most jobs, especially those involving
“idiosyncratic tasks”3 the firm-specific human capital is an important input
for the firm. Familiarity with the physical environment (Doeringer and Piore
[7]), customer relationships (Anderson and Schimittlein [2]), the ability to
communicate and work eﬀectively with the members of a team (Mailath and
Postlewaite [13], and Klein [11]) are examples of firm-specific human capital.
When the firm-specific skills develop as a result of on-the-job training that
is, an investment in human capital, the possibility of ex-post bargaining cre-
ates both ex-ante and ex-post ineﬃciencies. The ex-ante ineﬃciency arises
because the parties’ incentives to invest in specific human capital are dis-
torted.4 The ex-post ineﬃciency arises because the worker may strategically
disclose his specialized skills during the ex-post bargaining, causing delays in
bargaining. In this model we focus on the firm-specific human capital that
accrues naturally to the worker during the course of his employment without
a significant cost to either him or the firm. In this way, we isolate the eﬀects
of the ex-ante investment decisions and study only the ex-post ineﬃciencies
that may arise in the relationship.
It is a well known result in the bargaining literature that if there is an
informational asymmetry between the negotiating parties, then in equilib-
rium delays occur in real time (for example, see Admati and Perry [1]). In
these models, the delay serves as a signalling device. Recently, the works of
Fernandez and Glazer [8], Haller and Holden [10], and Busch and Wen [4]
2Instead, hierarchical organization of labor such as internal labor markets promotes
eﬃciency by avoiding individual bargaining. The internal labor markets paradigm which
is pioneered by Doeringer and Piore [7], argues that there are hierarchical carrer structure
within a firm. The wages are attached to jobs rather than workers which eliminates the
ineﬃcient bargaining between the firm and its incumbent workers.
3Williamson et. al. [22] discusses the underlying factors that give rise to job idiosyn-
cracies and the eﬃcieny implications of alternative organizational frameworks in which
idiosyncratic exchange can be accomodated.
4Becker [3] is among the first who considered incentives to invest in specific human
capital. For a theoretical model of how ex-post bargaining creates distortions in parties’
incentives to invest, see Grossman and Hart [9] and Mumcu [14]
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show that delays can also be observed in equilibrium in bargaining games
with perfect information. The alternating oﬀers bargaining game with con-
stant disagreement payoﬀs has a unique equilibrium. If the disagreement
payoﬀs are endogenous, that is, if the value of disagreement payoﬀs depend
on the actions taken by players in each period, then the players’ oﬀers in the
bargaining game depend not only on the past rejected oﬀers, but also on the
actions taken in the disagreement stage. As in repeated games, multiple equi-
libria exist because the history-dependent strategies can be used to punish
the players for deviations from the proposed equilibrium actions, thus deter-
ring deviations. If the game has multiple equilibria, ineﬃcient equilibrium
where delays occur can easily be constructed.
In this model, the firm and the incumbent worker bargain over the to-
tal division of surplus. The bargaining game takes place concurrently with
the production. If the firm and the worker do not reach an agreement, pro-
duction takes place and the worker is paid according to the initial contract.
The worker can either exert high eﬀort levels and produce the maximum
feasible output or shirk, thus, produce less than the maximum. Since the
worker does not bear any disutility if he shirks, he receives a higher payoﬀ
if he shirks during every period when an agreement is not reached. In fact,
by committing to shirk in every period, the worker guarantees himself the
highest equilibrium payoﬀ. If, however, the total output is suﬃciently large,
the firm can support the action “not shirk” in the disagreement game by
compensating the worker’s loss from choosing this action by oﬀering him a
higher wage in the next period. If the worker deviates from his prescribed
equilibrium strategy, he is punished in the next period as the firm proposes a
smaller wage. By using history-dependent strategies, we show that the game
has many equilibria some of which are ineﬃcient. In ineﬃcient equilibria the
agreement is delayed and the worker shirks in every period up to agreement.
This paper contributes to the literature on non-Walrasian wage bargain-
ing where the existence of wage diﬀerentials in labor market is attributed
to the higher bargaining power of insiders compared to outsiders. In these
models, however, the way in which the worker’s firm-specific skills increases
his bargaining power is not explicitly modelled. In Shaked and Sutton [18]
this bargaining power is characterized by the firm’s inability to replace its
current workforce on the spot. The firm’s current workforce enjoys a bar-
gaining advantage because it is time-consuming for the firm to replace them.
During the wage bargaining, the firm bargains with the incumbent worker for
a number of periods before it makes an oﬀer to an outsider. The game has
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a unique equilibrium. If the time period during which the firm is forced to
bargain with the insider decreases, the equilibrium approaches a Walrasian
solution. If the time period increases, then the outsider does not represent
a threat to the insider and the equilibrium is similar to the one in bilateral
monopoly. Recently, Stole and Zwiebel [19], [20] developed a model of intra-
firm bargaining between the firm and its skilled employees in order to explain
the firm’s input and organizational design decisions. In their model of intra-
firm bargaining, the firm has many employees but it bargains with each one
individually. The worker’s bargaining power stems from his threat to quit.
This threat is credible insofar as it deprives the firm from the worker’s con-
tribution, thus, weakens its position against the remaining workers. The
bargaining game has a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. An extension of
this model is studied in Wollinsky [23] where the firm has the opportunity
to replace the existing workers.
All of these models of bargaining between the firm and the incumbent
workers assume that the production takes place after a new agreement is
reached. In contrast, in our model the intra-firm bargaining game takes place
concurrently with production. The worker’s decision in the disagreement
stage involves how much eﬀort to exert. If the worker chooses to strike in
the disagreement stage, hence, produce nothing, both players’ disagreement
payoﬀs are zero. In this sense the intra-firm bargaining models described in
these papers can be seen as a special case of ours.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section
2.1 solves for the equilibrium of the bargaining game when the firm does
not have an outside option. Section 2.2 presents the bargaining game when
the firm can exercise its outside option after rejecting an oﬀer and section 3
concludes.
2 The Model
In this model, a firm is randomly matched with a worker from a competitive
market of identical workers. They sign a contract that specifies the wage
that the agent will be paid for a day’s work. This wage is equal to the
competitive wage which is denoted w0. This relationship produces an amount
of output that is normalized to 1 in each production period. We assume that
initially the worker is unskilled and he does not need to exert eﬀort to perform
the job. However, as the worker continues to work in the same firm, his
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productivity increases as he acquires firm-specific human capital. He develops
these skills without exerting any eﬀort. We assume that, after some time, the
worker is able to produce A > 1 units of output when he combines his firm-
specific skills with high levels of eﬀort. High eﬀort levels imposes disutility
c to the worker. Although the incumbent worker was drawn from a pool of
identical workers before the initial contract was signed, he gradually becomes
more productive than the outsiders. Hence the employment relationship
resembles a bilateral monopoly. Once the initial contract expires, the worker
can negotiate with the firm to raise his wage above the competitive wage.5
We characterize the wage negotiation as an alternating oﬀers bargaining
game between the firm and the incumbent worker which takes place concur-
rently with the production. The structure of the game is as follows. In each
odd-numbered period the worker proposes a new wage contract wt. The firm
then responds by either accepting or rejecting the oﬀer. If the firm accepts
the oﬀer, the negotiation game ends. In the new wage contract the worker re-
ceives the average payoﬀ wt, and the firm receives the average payoﬀ A−wt,
thereafter. If the firm rejects the oﬀer, then the players receive their dis-
agreement payoﬀs which depend on the actions taken by each player. The
firm faces a choice between hiring a new unskilled worker from the compet-
itive market, or continuing to bargain with the incumbent worker. In the
former case, the firm obtains the average payoﬀ 1 − w0. We assume that if
the incumbent worker is fired, he earns the competitive wage, w0, elsewhere.
If the firm chooses not to fire the incumbent worker following a rejection,
the worker is paid w0 during that period. The worker can either work hard
and produce the output A, or shirk and produce 1− ε. If the worker works
hard he incurs disutility c in monetary terms. Therefore, his utility when he
works is w0 − c. If he shirks he does not expend any eﬀort, hence his utility
is w0.6 The worker’s decision is observed by the firm and time advances one
period.
In every even-numbered period, the firm oﬀers a wage contract, wt, to
the worker. The worker then responds by either accepting or rejecting the
oﬀer. The acceptance of the oﬀer implements a binding contract between the
firm and the agent that holds forever. If the worker rejects the oﬀer, then
5If there is no breach penalties, the worker could also ask for the raise before the initial
contract has expired.
6Since the unskilled worker does not choose his eﬀort level, the initial contract does not
specify payments contingent on eﬀort. Once the worker becomes skilled, he can choose
whether or not to work hard. Regardless of his decision, however he is paid w0.
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the worker chooses between shirking and not shirking.7 The same rules as
described above govern the consequences of these decisions. We assume that
A− c > 1− ε (1)
This implies that agreement is strictly preferred to disagreement. We also
assume that
A > w0 + c. (2)
This condition implies that the total output is suﬃciently large so that the
firm can aﬀord to pay the worker his disutility of work above the competitive
wage. If this condition does not hold, then the production is not eﬃcient and
an agreement between the incumbent worker and the firm is never reached.
In the unique equilibrium of the game, the firm quits the bargaining game
and hires a new worker. Both the firm and the worker have the same discount
factor 0 < δ < 1. The worker’s objective is to maximize the discounted sum
of net earnings,
∞X
t=0
δt(wt − c)
and the firm’s objective is to maximize the discounted sum of profits,
∞X
t=0
δt (zt − wt)
where zt = A, 1 or 1− ε depending on whether the firm continues to bargain
or reaches an agreement with the incumbent worker or hires a new worker,
and whether the incumbent worker works hard or shirks.
We study the subgame-perfect equilibria of the game described above.
Subgame-perfect equilibrium strategies induce a Nash equilibrium in every
proper subgame. This game has four typical subgames: at the beginning of
each period t when a player makes an oﬀer, right after a proposal is made,
right after a rejection and right after the firm decides whether to stay with the
incumbent worker. We assume that each player observes every past action.
A strategy for player i, where i stands for either the worker, w, or the firm,
7Note that we only allow the firm to opt out after responding an oﬀer to simplify the
analysis. If the firm can opt out in every period then the game has multiple equilibria also
when the firm’s outside option is binding.
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f , is a function σi, which assigns an appropriate action to every possible
history.
The model has the characteristics of a repeated game in an alternating
oﬀers bargaining game. In a simple bargaining model (Rubinstein [16]), the
equilibrium strategies are a function of only past proposals and rejections.
In this model, the players have a richer set of actions. The strategies are also
a function of whether or not the worker has shirked in the past. Therefore,
the firm can use strategies, such as punishing the worker if he shirked in any
of the previous periods or compensating him in the next period if he has
not shirked. When such reward and punishment mechanisms are available to
the players, the game, in general, has multiple equilibria and also ineﬃcient
equilibria.
2.1 Firm has no outside option
We call G0, the game where the firm has no outside option. In the G0 game,
the disagreement payoﬀs are determined solely by the actions of the worker.
We consider a subgame following a rejection. In this subgame, shirking yields
to the worker a higher payoﬀ in that period. If the worker commits himself
to shirking in every period following a rejection, then the game resembles a
Rubinstein game with disagreement payoﬀs (w0, 1− ε− w0). There exists a
unique equilibrium where the worker receives w = w0 + A−1+ε1+δ +
δc
1+δ , the
firm receives A− w, and the agreement is reached in the first period. The
firm immediately accepts the wage proposal w. If she does not accept, she
receives 1−ε−w0 this period and A− bw from the next period onward wherebw = w0 + c1+δ + δ(A−1+ε)1+δ . This payoﬀ is equal to receiving an average payoﬀ
A− w every period. If an oﬀer is rejected, the worker does not deviate from
shirking, since “not shirking” yields a lower payoﬀ in that period, and the
continuation strategies are not aﬀected by a deviation.
The wage contract w is not the only equilibrium of the game. Given
the strategy profile above, the firm obtains A − w0 if the worker does not
shirk in the disagreement stage. This is not attainable as “not shirk” is a
suboptimal action for the worker. If, however, the strategy profile is changed
in such a way so that the continuation payoﬀ to the worker depends on the
action he chooses in the disagreement stage, the firm can increase her payoﬀ
in the disagreement stage. By obtaining a higher payoﬀ in the disagreement
stage, the firm can also obtain a higher equilibrium payoﬀ from the game by
inducing the worker to choose not to shirk. If in the next period the firm
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compensates the worker for the loss generated by not shirking by proposing
a higher share so that the worker’s discounted payoﬀ remains the same, he
is indiﬀerent between shirking and not shirking. In other words, if the firm
oﬀers to the worker wt+1 if he shirked in period t, and wt+1 + (1−δ)cδ if he
did not shirk, the worker is indiﬀerent between shirking and not shirking in
period t following rejection. Since he is indiﬀerent, he chooses a suboptimal
action, “not shirk”, in the disagreement stage. The firm is willing to oﬀer
this additional payment because her net average payoﬀ if the worker does not
shirk, (A− w0 − c) (1− δ) + δ wt+1, is greater than her average payoﬀ if the
worker shirks, (1− ε− w0) (1− δ) + δ wt+1. This is true since A− c > 1− ε
by assumption in 1. If we rewrite assumption 1 as
A− 1 + ε > c
the gains from “not shirking” exceeds the costs. Therefore, it is feasible
for the firm to support the action “not shirk” in the disagreement stage.
Given the player’s highest and lowest disagreement payoﬀs, we describe the
equilibrium of the game in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Any wage contract w such that,
w0 + c ≤ w ≤ w0 +
A− 1 + ε
1 + δ
+
δc
1 + δ
can be generated as an equilibrium wage contract with agreement reached in
the first period.
Proof The formal definition of the equilibrium strategies are presented
in the Appendix. We also prove that these strategies are subgame-perfect
and generate w = w0 + A−1+ε1+δ +
δc
1+δ as the maximum wage and w = w0 + c
as the minimum wage the worker can obtain in equilibrium.
Note that w and w are the lowest and highest wages the worker can
obtain. His lowest utility is w0, which is equal to his reservation utility. His
highest utility is w0− c1+δ+
A−1+ε
1+δ , which is greater than w0 under assumption
1.
The subgame-perfect equilibrium strategies that generate w as an equilib-
rium are the following. The worker’s strategy is to shirk after every rejection,
oﬀer w in every odd-numbered period, and in every even-numbered period
accept an oﬀerwt such that, wt ≥ bw, where bw = w0+ c1+δ+ δ(A−1+ε)1+δ , and reject
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otherwise. The firm’s corresponding subgame-perfect equilibrium strategy is
to propose bw in every even-numbered period and accept any oﬀer that pays
wt ≤ w in every odd-numbered period.
The minimum wage equilibrium, w, is generated by the following pair of
strategies. The firm proposes w + (1−δ)cδ in every even-numbered period if
the worker did not shirk in the previous period and proposes w otherwise.
She accepts any oﬀer that pays wt ≤ w in every odd-numbered period. If
the firm deviates from her strategy, she is punished by the maximum wage
equilibrium, w. The worker’s strategy is to oﬀer at least w in every odd-
numbered periods and accept any oﬀer wt ≥ w in every even—numbered
period. In every even-numbered period he shirks if he is not oﬀered at least
w or he does not accept an acceptable oﬀer and in every odd-numbered period
he shirks if he asks more than w or his proposal of w is rejected.
The equilibrium strategy that we propose calls for the worker to shirk in
every even-numbered period and not to shirk in the odd-numbered periods.
A strategy that calls for the worker not to shirk in every period generates
the same result. If we consider an alternating oﬀers bargaining game with
constant disagreement payoﬀs in every period, a player’s equilibrium payoﬀ
is increasing in his disagreement payoﬀ only during periods that he responds
to an oﬀer. If his disagreement payoﬀ is high, his acceptable oﬀer will be
high, hence he can obtain a higher share from the bargaining game. When
the player makes a proposal and his oﬀer is accepted, he collects the resid-
ual. In this case the size of his payoﬀ depends negatively on the opponent’s
disagreement payoﬀ. As long as agreement is preferred to disagreement, the
residual he obtains exceeds his disagreement payoﬀ. Thus, his disagreement
payoﬀ is irrelevant. In the game we analyze, the worker receives the same
disagreement payoﬀ regardless of whether or not he shirks. He receives w0 in
even-numbered periods because he shirks. In odd-numbered periods he does
not shirk and receives w0 − c, but he is compensated in the next period, so
that on the average he obtains w0 in odd-numbered periods as well. From
the firm’s point of view, the actions taken by the worker during periods when
the firm makes an oﬀer do not aﬀect the equilibrium payoﬀ that he receives.
However, during periods when the worker responds to an oﬀer, the firm guar-
antees herself the highest sustainable disagreement payoﬀ and thus receives
the highest equilibrium payoﬀ of the game if she supports the “not shirk”
action of the worker. (For a more detailed discussion on this see Busch and
Wen [4].) Any wage contract w such that w < w0 < w can be supported
by subgame-perfect equilibrium strategies by punishing the worker with the
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minimum wage equilibrium if he deviates and the firm with the maximum
wage equilibrium if she deviates.
The wage increase the worker can capture from the bargaining game
ranges between c and δc
1+δ+
A−1+ε
1+δ . The minimum wage contract equalizes the
worker’s utility to his reservation utility, w0. Thus, the worker is indiﬀerent
between working in this firm or elsewhere. The maximum wage contract
is increasing in the parameter ε. ε can be interpreted as a measure of the
worker’s ability to hold-up the firm in wage negotiation and ε takes values
between [0, 1).
2.1.1 Ineﬃcient Equilibria
Besides the eﬃcient subgame-perfect equilibria in which the agreement is
reached at the first period, the bargaining game also has ineﬃcient equilibria
in which delays occur in real time before an agreement is reached. The
following proposition characterizes these ineﬃcient equilibria.
Proposition 2 If ew is such that
w0 + c ≤ ew ≤ δT − 1δT (A− 1 + ε+ w0) + 1δT w
then there is a subgame-perfect equilibrium in which the worker shirks for
T periods followed by an agreement of ew.
Proof We provide conditions that are suﬃcient for deviations not to
occur. Along the equilibrium path, the player’s strategies are as follows. In
every odd-numbered period up to period T + 1, the worker makes a non-
serious oﬀer to the firm and the firm rejects his oﬀer. In every period up to
the period T +1, the worker shirks. In period T +1, the worker oﬀers ew if it
is an odd-numbered period, and accepts any oﬀer that pays him at least ew,
if it is an even-numbered period. The firm makes a non-serious oﬀer to the
worker in every even-numbered period up to T +1 . In T +1, the firm oﬀersew, if it is even numbered period, and accepts any oﬀer that pays at least ew,
if it is an odd-numbered period.
The worker can always obtain w in the first period. In order for the
worker to be willing to shirk for T periods and receive ew in period T +1, he
should prefer to receive w0 for T periods and ew thereafter. Hence,
11
w0
1− δ ≤
w0 − δTw0
1− δ +
δT ( ew − c)
1− δ
or
w0 + c ≤ ew
In the same manner, the firm can obtain her lowest equilibrium payoﬀ,
A − w in the first period. In order for the firm not to deviate from the
equilibrium strategy, she should prefer to receive (1− ε− w0) for T periods
and ew thereafter. Hence,
A− w
1− δ ≤ (1− ε− w0) + ....+ δ
T−1 (1− ε− w0) +
δT (A− ew)
1− δ
which is equivalent to
ew ≤ δT − 1
δT
(A− 1 + ε+ w0) +
1
δT
w
In order for ew to exist, w0+c has to be smaller than δT−1δT (A− 1 + ε+ w0)+
1
δT w which holds always given assumption 1. The player’s deviations from
the strategies described above is eliminated by “equilibrium switching”. If
the worker deviates, he is punished with the minimum wage contract. If the
firm deviates, then she is punished with the maximum wage contract.
2.2 Bargaining with outside option
In every odd-numbered period, the rejection of the worker’s proposal leaves
the firm with the choice of firing the incumbent and hiring a new worker,
or continuing to bargain with the incumbent worker. If the new worker is
hired, he is paid the competitive wage, w0, and produces 1 unit of output.
We assume that, once the new unskilled worker is hired, the firm and the
worker sign an infinitely-lived contract and the worker remains permanently
unskilled. We call this the G1 game. In an alternating oﬀers bargaining
game, the outside option changes the equilibrium of the game if and only if
the firm obtains a higher payoﬀ by exercising this option than by continuing
to bargain with the incumbent worker.8 If the firm rejects the worker’s oﬀer
8See Shaked and Sutton [18] more on this.
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and hires a new worker, her discounted total payoﬀ is 1−w0
1−δ . If she stays with
the incumbent worker, she obtains at least A−w
1−δ . If the lowest equilibrium
payoﬀ the firm obtains in G0 is greater than her outside option, then the firm
never exercises this option. Since it does not constitute a credible threat, the
value of the outside option does not aﬀect the distribution of the surplus in
the G1 game. Thus, the set of equilibria of the G1 game is the same as the set
of equilibria of the G0 game. If, however, the firm’s outside option is binding,
then theG1 game has a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium in which the firm
receives her outside option. The following proposition describes the set of
equilibria of the bargaining game when the firm can quit the bargaining game
only after rejecting an oﬀer.
Proposition 3 If A − c − εδ > 1, then the firm’s outside option is never
binding and the set of equilibria of the G1 game is the same as the set of
equilibria of the G0 game. If 1 ≤ A − c < 1 + εδ , then the firm’s outside
option is binding for some equilibria of the G0 game. Hence, the G1 game
has multiple equilibria in which the firm receives at least her outside option,
1 − w0. If A − c ≤ 1, then the firm’s outside option is always binding and
the G1 game has a unique equilibrium in which the firm fires the incumbent
worker and hires a new worker and receives 1− w0.
Proof A formal proof of this proposition can be found in Osborne and
Rubinstein [15].
We now discuss the derivation of the conditions in proposition 3. In any
subgame-perfect equilibrium of this game the firm receives, at least, A− w,
and at most, A − c − w0. The firm’s outside option is never binding if the
average payoﬀ she receives from the outside option is less than the lowest
average equilibrium payoﬀ she obtains from the G0 game. In other words, if
1− w0 < A− w
or, equivalently,
A− c− ε
δ
> 1
then the firm never exercises her outside option in any subgame-perfect equi-
librium of the game. Thus, the set of equilibria of the game G1 coincides with
the set of equilibria of the game G0.
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If the average payoﬀ that the firm receives from the outside option is
greater that her lowest average equilibrium payoﬀ, but smaller than her high-
est average equilibrium payoﬀ, then the firm’s outside option is binding for
some of the equilibria of the G0 game. This happens if
1 < A− c < 1 + ε
δ
.
Then the lowest equilibrium payoﬀ the firm obtains in the G1 game is 1−w0
and the highest payoﬀ is, as before, A− c− w0.
The firm’s outside option is always binding if the average payoﬀ from
the outside option is greater than her highest average equilibrium payoﬀ. In
this case the firm asks at least 1 − w0. If the worker accepts this oﬀer, he
receives A−1+w0. However, the wage that the worker receives must satisfy
his individual rationality constraint, i.e. A − 1 + w0 > w0 + c. Otherwise,
the worker does not accept the contract. This condition implies that A −
c > 1, which contradicts the assumption that the outside option is binding.
Therefore, if the outside option is binding, the unique equilibrium of the game
is the one where the firm quits the bargaining game in the first period and
hires an unskilled worker from the competitive labor market. This occurs if
c is too high. Even though the firm can compensate the worker for exerting
high eﬀort, i.e. A > c + w0, it is not profitable for her to do so. As her
net surplus from hiring an unskilled worker, 1 − w0, is higher than her net
surplus from hiring the skilled worker, A − c − w0. The equilibrium of the
game is ineﬃcient because 1 unit of output is produced, instead of A > 1.
It can be easily shown that ineﬃcient equilibria always exist in the second
case of the lemma 3 where the firm’s outside option is binding only for some
equilibria of the G0 game. Both players can obtain their lowest payoﬀ in a
perfect equilibrium where the agreement is reached in the first period. The
worker can always obtain w in the first period. In order for the worker to be
willing to shirk for T periods and receive w∗ in period T +1, he should prefer
to receive w0 for T periods and w∗ thereafter. Hence,
w0
1− δ ≤
w0 − δTw0
1− δ +
δT (w∗ − c)
1− δ .
or
w0 + c ≤ w∗
In the same manner, the firm can obtain her lowest equilibrium payoﬀ,
1 − w0, in the first period. In order for the firm not to deviate from the
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equilibrium strategy, she should prefer to receive (1− ε− w0) for T periods
and w∗ thereafter. Hence, we have
1− w0 ≤ (1− ε− w0) + ....+ δT−1 (1− ε− w0) + δTw∗
which is equivalent to
w∗ ≤ A− ε
Ã
1− δT
δT
!
− (1− w0) .
In order for w∗ to exist, w0+c has to be smaller than A−ε
³
1−δT
δT
´
−(1− w0)
which holds always given assumption 1.
3 Concluding Remarks
We study the bargaining relationship between a firm and its incumbent
worker who possesses firm-specific human capital. The incumbent worker
is more productive than the outsiders because of the special skills and in-
formation he acquires during his employment. During the contract renewal
stage, the worker can strategically disclose these skills in order to increase
his bargaining power. The firm can threaten to fire the worker and hire an
unskilled worker in the competitive market, but this threat is not always
credible. When the firm’s outside option is not binding, the bargaining game
has multiple equilibria, some of which are ineﬃcient. In the minimum wage
equilibrium, the worker is paid a wage so that he is indiﬀerent between work-
ing in this firm or elsewhere at the competitive wage. In the maximum wage
equilibrium, the worker is able to capture part of the surplus created by
his increased productivity. The worker’s rent is increasing in his ability to
strategically disclose his skills. In the ineﬃcient equilibria, the agreement
is reached in period T > 1 and the worker shirks in every period prior to
agreement.
If the firm’s outside option is binding for some equilibria of the game,
then the lowest equilibrium payoﬀ the firm receives is bounded by the value
of her outside option. If the firm’s outside option is always binding, then
in the unique equilibrium of the game the firm fires the incumbent worker
and hires an unskilled worker. In this case, even though the production is
eﬃcient, it is not profitable for the firm to compensate the worker because
his disutility of exerting eﬀort is very high. Thus, in the equilibrium the
amount of output produced is less than the eﬃcient amount.
15
The existing literature on the wage bargaining between the firm and its
skilled workers emphasizes that firm-specific human capital is the source of
the worker’s increased bargaining power. However, these models fail to cap-
ture the ex-post ineﬃciency that may arise as a result of the bargaining. In
our model, the ex-post ineﬃciency arises because of the workers’ opportunis-
tic behavior during the bargaining. By shirking during the periods in which
the agreement has not been reached the worker is able to capture a rent by
obtaining a higher wage. Our results support the conclusions of Williamson
et al [22] who argue that when jobs involve specialized skills and informa-
tion that can be learned by on-the-job training, the market fails to eﬃciently
carry out the exchange between the firm and its employee.
4 Appendix
We define H1 (t) be the history at the beginning of period t, which consists
of all the rejected oﬀers and the disagreement outcomes up to date, H2 (t) is
the history after an oﬀer has been made in period t, and H3 (t) is the history
after a rejection in period t. We denote σi to be the player i’s strategy which
assigns an appropriate action to every possible history.
For every period t, we define Dt to be the function of all actions taken in
that period excluding the worker’s decision whether to shirk, such that,
Dt =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
fd if t is even and wt < σf (h1 (t))
if t is odd, wt ≤ σw (h1 (t)) but the firm rejected.
wd if t is odd and wt > σw (h1 (t))
if t is even, wt > σf (h1 (t)) but the worker rejected.
nod otherwise.
Dt indicates whether or not the firm or the worker has deviated in period
t prior to the worker’s decision to shirk. If Dt = fd, the firm has deviated
because she either made an incorrect oﬀer if t is an even-numbered period,
or she did not accept an acceptable oﬀer when t is an odd-numbered period.
If Dt = wd, the worker has deviated because he either made an incorrect
oﬀer when t is an odd-numbered period, or he did not accept an acceptable
oﬀer when t is an even-numbered period. If neither the firm nor the worker
has deviated, then Dt = nod.
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For every period t, let FDt be a function of actions taken in period t such
that
FDt =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
d if Dt = fd
nd otherwise
FDt indicates whether or not the firm has deviated in period t. Similarly,
let WDt be a function of all actions taken in period t such that
WDt =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
d if Dt = wd; or
if τ is odd, Dt = nod for any τ ≤ t but
the worker shirked in that period
nd otherwise
WDt indicates whether or not the worker has deviated in period t. The
proposed equilibrium strategy in the odd-numbered periods prescribes that
the worker shirks only if either the firm or the worker deviated from their
equilibrium strategy profiles in the previous stage of the game. Therefore,
the worker has deviated in period t if he shirks even though neither he nor
the firm has deviated in previous stages of the game. We also define It for
every period t and τ , τ 0 < t as
It =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
f if sup {τ | FDτ = d} > sup {τ 0 |WDτ 0 = d}
w if sup {τ | FDτ = d} ≤ sup {τ 0 |WDτ 0 = d}
nod if sup {τ | FDτ = d} = sup {τ 0 |WDτ 0 = d} = 0
It is a function that indicates the identity of the player who last deviated
from his/her strategy profile in history up to period t. τ is the last period
prior to period t in which the firm deviated and τ 0 is the last period prior
to period t in which the worker deviated. If τ > τ 0 then the firm is the
last deviant. If τ < τ 0 then the worker is the last deviant. If τ = τ 0 then
the worker is again the last deviant since he makes the last move within a
period, by choosing between shirking and not shirking.9 Then the following
9If τ = τ 0 and τ is even, the firm deviated by making an incorrect oﬀer. If the worker
deviates by accepting the firm’s incorrect oﬀer the game is over. Therefore, the only
possible deviation for the worker is to make an incorrect shirking decision and he becomes
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strategies generate w as an equilibrium wage, for any w ∈ [w,w]. For period
1
σw (h1 (1)) = w
σf (h2 (1)) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
N if σw (h2 (1)) > w
Y otherwise
σw (h3 (1)) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
ns if D1 = nod
s otherwise
For t odd and greater than 1,
σw (h1 (t)) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
w if It = f ; or
w if It = w
w otherwise
σf (h2 (t)) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
Y if σw (h2 (t)) < w; or
if σw (h2 (t)) ≤ w but It = f
N otherwise
σw (h3 (t)) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
ns if Dt = nod and It = nod
s otherwise
For t even,
σf (h1 (t)) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
bw if It = f ; or
w if It = w
w + c(1−δ)δ otherwise
σw (h2 (t)) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
Y if σf (h1 (t)) > bw; or
if wt ≥ w and It = w
N otherwise
σw (h3 (t)) = s
the last deviant. If τ = τ 0 and τ is odd then the only way the firm has deviated is by
rejecting a correct oﬀer. The only way the worker can deviate is by making an incorrect
shirking decision. Since the worker’s shirking decision takes place after the firm rejects
the oﬀer, the worker is the last deviant.
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where bw = δ(A−1+ε)
1+δ +
c
1+δ + w0.
In order to show that the proposed equilibrium strategies profile generates
a subgame-perfect equilibrium, we prove that there is no one-shot profitable
deviation from this strategies profile in any proper subgame of the game.
First, we show that this is true for the first period. The bargaining game
starts with the worker making an oﬀer. We claim that any wage contract
w can be generated as a subgame-perfect equilibrium wage of the game, for
any w ∈ [w,w]. If the worker follows the proposed strategy and asks for w
and the firm accepts it, the worker receives the discounted total payoﬀ w−c
1−δ
and the firm receives A−w
1−δ . If the worker deviates and asks for x1 higher
than w, the firm rejects the oﬀer. Then the worker shirks and receives w0
this period. Next period, the firm oﬀers w to the worker. If the worker
accepts this oﬀer he obtains w0
1−δ , which is less than or equal to
w−c
1−δ . Hence,
the worker does not gain from asking a higher wage. If the worker asks for
w and the firm rejects, the worker shirks next period and the firm obtains
1− ε − w0 this period. Next period the firm proposes bw to the worker and
the worker accepts. The firm’s total discounted payoﬀ from this deviation is
1− ε−w0+ δ1−δ (A− bw) which is less than or equal to A−w1−δ . Hence, the firm
does not gain from rejecting the worker’s proposal. If the worker asks for x1,
which is higher than w, and the firm deviates from the proposed strategy
by accepting the oﬀer, then the firm receives A−x1
1−δ which is less than
A−w
1−δ .
Thus, the firm will not accept such an oﬀer. If the worker ask for x1 which
is higher than w and the firm rejects his oﬀer, the worker obtains w0
1−δ if he
shirks following the firm’s refusal. If he does not shirk, however, he obtains
w0−c this period, he is oﬀered w next period and his total discounted payoﬀ
is w0
1−δ − c. Thus, not shirking is not a profitable deviation.
Next we show that there is no profitable one-shot deviation from the
proposed equilibrium strategies profile for either of the players in any proper
subgame. There are two possible histories for each subgame. The first type
is one where the firm is the last deviant and the second type is one where
the worker is the last deviant. We consider a subgame in the beginning
of period t. Regardless of the path that led the game to this point, the
proposed strategies are prescribed contingent on the identity of the player
who last deviated in that history. We now consider two histories, h1 (t) and
h01 (t) that lead to the subgame in period t. As long as the identity of the
last deviant is the same in both histories, the strategies, as a function of
these histories, will be the same. Thus, it is suﬃcient to check the subgame
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perfection for these two types of histories. We show that for any wage w,
such that, w ≤ w ≤ w, there is no profitable one-shot deviation from the
proposed strategies profile for either player in any subgame following the two
possible histories.
We consider a subgame that starts in an odd-numbered period with a
history where the worker deviated last. The proposed equilibrium strategy
prescribes that the worker asks for w and the firm accepts it. The worker
obtains w0
1−δ and the firm receives
A−c−w0
1−δ by playing this strategy. If the
worker asks for wt higher than w, the firm rejects the oﬀer. Then the worker
shirks and receives w0 this period. Next period, the firm oﬀers w to the
worker. The worker’s total discounted payoﬀ from deviating is w0
1−δ . Thus,
the worker does not gain by deviating from this strategy. If the worker
asks w and the firm rejects the proposed wage, then the worker shirks. The
firm receives 1 − ε − w0 this period and next period she oﬀers bw since she
deviated by not accepting the oﬀer. The firm’s total discounted payoﬀ is
1−ε−w0+ δ1−δ (A− bw) which is less than A−c−w01−δ . Thus, rejecting the worker’s
oﬀer is not a profitable deviation for the firm. If the worker asks for wt that is
larger than w and the firm deviates from the proposed equilibrium strategy
by accepting the oﬀer, the firm receives A−wt
1−δ , which is less than
A−c−w0
1−δ .
Thus, the firm will not accept such an oﬀer. If the worker asks for wt > w
and the firm rejects, then the worker obtains w0
1−δ if he shirks following the
firm’s refusal. The worker receives w0 this period and is oﬀered w thereafter
since he deviated by asking a higher wage. If the worker does not shirk,
however, he obtains w0 − c this period and w from the next period onward.
Thus, his total discounted payoﬀ from not shirking is w0
1−δ − c. Therefore, the
worker does not deviate.
We now consider a subgame beginning in an odd-numbered period where
the firm was the last deviant. The proposed equilibrium strategy calls for
the worker to propose w and the firm to accept the oﬀer. Following this
strategy, the worker receives w−c
1−δ and the firm receives
A−w
1−δ . If the worker
asks for wt that is larger than w, the firm rejects the oﬀer. Then the worker
shirks and receives w0 this period. Next period, the firm oﬀers the worker w
because the worker has deviated by asking a higher wage. The worker’s total
discounted payoﬀ is w0
1−δ − c, which is smaller than
w−c
1−δ . Thus the worker
will not deviate. If the worker oﬀers w and the firm rejects, then the worker
shirks. The firm receives 1−ε−w0 this period and next period the firm oﬀersbw since she deviated by not accepting the oﬀer. The firm’s total discounted
payoﬀ is 1− ε − w0 + δ1−δ (A− bw), which is less than A−w1−δ . Thus, rejecting
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the worker’s oﬀer is not a profitable deviation for the firm. If the worker asks
for wt that is larger than w and the firm deviates from the proposed strategy
by accepting the oﬀer, the firm receives A−wt
1−δ , which is less than
A−w
1−δ . Thus,
the firm will not accept such an oﬀer. If the worker ask for wt > w and
the firm rejects, then the worker obtains w0
1−δ if he shirks following the firm’s
refusal. If he does not shirk, he obtains w0 − c this period and is oﬀered w
next period, thus he obtains w0
1−δ − c, which is less than
w0
1−δ . Hence, he does
not deviate from his proposed equilibrium strategy (shirk) if his oﬀer is not
accepted.
Next we consider a subgame beginning in an even-numbered period where
the worker is the last deviant. The proposed equilibrium strategy prescribes
that the firm oﬀers w and the worker accepts it. The worker obtains w0
1−δ
and the firm receives A−c−w0
1−δ by playing this equilibrium strategy. If the
firm oﬀers wt that is smaller than w, the worker rejects the oﬀer and shirks.
The firm receives 1 − ε − w0 this period. Next period, the worker asks for
w because the firm deviated by making an incorrect oﬀer. The firm’s total
discounted payoﬀ from deviating is 1−ε−w0+ δ1−δ (A− w), which is smaller
than A−c−w0
1−δ . Thus the firm does not deviate from his proposed strategy. If
the firm oﬀers w and the worker rejects it, then the worker shirks. The worker
receives w0 this period and next period the firm oﬀers w. The worker’s total
discounted payoﬀ is w0
1−δ , which is the same as what he would have received
if he accepted the initial oﬀer in the first place. Thus the worker does not
deviate. If the firm oﬀers wt that is smaller than w and the worker deviates
from the proposed strategy by accepting the oﬀer, the worker receives wt−c
1−δ ,
which is less than w0
1−δ , the payoﬀ he obtains by rejecting the oﬀer. Thus,
the worker will not accept such an oﬀer. If the firm oﬀers wt > w and the
worker rejects, then the worker receives w0 − c + δ1−δ (w − c) if he does not
shirk following the firm’s refusal. Note that the firm is the last deviant by
making an incorrect proposal. Since the worker receives w0 + δ1−δ (w − c) if
he shirks, he does not deviate from his proposed strategy in this subgame.
We now consider a subgame beginning in an even-numbered period where
the firm is the last deviant. The proposed equilibrium strategy prescribes
that the firm oﬀers bw and the worker accepts it. The worker obtains bw−c
1−δ
and the firm receives A−bw
1−δ by playing this proposed strategy. If the firm
oﬀers wage wt that is smaller than w, the worker rejects the oﬀer and shirks.
The firm receives 1 − ε − w0 this period. Next period, the worker asks for
w because the firm deviated by making an incorrect oﬀer. The firm’s total
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discounted payoﬀ from deviating is 1−ε−w0+ δ1−δ (A− w), which is smaller
than A−bw
1−δ . Thus, the firm does not deviate from his proposed strategy. If the
firm oﬀers bw and the worker rejects it, then the worker shirks. The worker
receives w0 this period and next period the worker asks for w because the
worker has deviated by not accepting the correct oﬀer. The worker’s total
discounted payoﬀ is w0
1−δ which is less than
bw−c
1−δ . Thus rejecting the oﬀer
is not a profitable deviation. If the firm oﬀers a wage wt which is smaller
than bw and the worker deviates from the proposed strategy by accepting the
oﬀer, the worker receives wt−c
1−δ . If the worker rejects the oﬀer he obtains
w0 + δ1−δ (w − c) which is equal to
bw−c
1−δ , hence, greater than
wt−c
1−δ . Thus, the
worker will not accept such an oﬀer. If the firm oﬀers wt < bw and the worker
rejects it, then the worker obtains w0 − c + δ1−δ (w − c) if he does not shirk
following the firm’s refusal. Since he receives w0 + δ1−δ (w − c) if he shirks,
the worker will not deviate from the proposed strategy in this subgame and
shirk following the firm’s refusal.
We have shown that the strategy profile described above generates a
subgame-perfect equilibrium wage w, for any w ∈ [w,w]. Next we show
that w and w are indeed the lowest and highest wages the worker can obtain
in the equilibrium generated by these strategies. We prove this by contra-
diction. Suppose that w is not the lowest equilibrium wage and there exist
w0 < w that can be generated as an equilibrium wage by the same strategies.
If the agreement is reached in the first period, the worker receives the total
discounted payoﬀ, w
0−c
1−δ and the firm receives
A−w0
1−δ . The following deviation
is profitable for the worker. If the worker deviates by asking a wage w > w0,
then the firm rejects and the worker shirks. The worker receives w0 this
period and next period the firm proposes w to the worker. If the worker
accepts his total discounted utility is w0+ δ1−δ (w − c), which is greater than
w0−c
1−δ . Since the worker gains from deviating, w
0 can not be an equilibrium
wage. This is true for any w0 < w.
Now we consider a wage contract w00 that pays more than w. The follow-
ing is a profitable deviation for the firm in the first period. The firm deviates
by rejecting the worker’s oﬀer and the worker shirks. The firm receives 1−
w0 −  this period and oﬀers bw next period. The worker accepts this oﬀer
and the firm receives a total discounted payoﬀ 1− w0 −  +
δ(A−bw)
1−δ , which
is greater than A−w
00
1−δ for any w
00 that is greater than w. Therefore any wage
contract w00 that pays more than w cannot be generated by the particular
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strategy profile we presented.
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